Takaichi and Japanese Rearmament

For the first time since 1945, a single party has enough votes to amend Japan's pacifist constitution. On February 8, Sanae Takaichi's Liberal Democratic Party swept 316 of 465 seats in the House of Representatives, an unprecedented postwar supermajority. Add the 36 seats from coalition partner Nippon Ishin no Kai and the ruling bloc controls 352 seats, three quarters of the chamber. The opposition was gutted: the second-largest party failed to reach 50 seats, another first.

Takaichi did not waste time. The day after her victory, she announced she would seek a constitutional referendum "as soon as possible" to amend Article 9, the clause that renounces war as an instrument of state policy and prohibits the maintenance of armed forces. In practice, Japan already fields Self-Defence Forces that rank among the most capable in the world, but the article keeps them in a legal grey zone that Takaichi wants to resolve. During the campaign, at a rally in Niigata, she framed it plainly: "Why can't we change the way the SDF are referenced in the Constitution? Let's protect their pride and empower them to be an effective organisation." It is the same agenda her political mentor Shinzo Abe pursued for years and failed to deliver. But Abe never had this majority.

The immediate obstacle is the upper house, where the LDP falls short of two thirds. She would need to bring in allies to reach the threshold, or wait until the 2028 elections. But the political momentum is clear, and the window is open. Trump gave her his "Complete and Total Endorsement" before the vote, unusual for a sitting American president in a foreign election. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent summed it up in a line worth more than any communiqué: "When Japan is strong, the US is strong in Asia."

What matters here is not so much Takaichi herself as what her victory represents. Ten years ago, talking about constitutional reform in Japan was the domain of academic seminars and niche opinion columns. Today it has a popular mandate and a legislative calendar. Japan's defence spending has already doubled and is on track to reach 2% of GDP. In November, Takaichi told parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan, which would authorise the deployment of the Self-Defence Forces. Beijing reacted furiously. Moscow too: Lavrov accused the Japanese government of pursuing "the militarisation of society."

The context is obvious: China, Taiwan, North Korea. But there is a deeper question, one that defines the era. Washington has spent eight decades underwriting Pacific security. That arrangement worked so long as the United States could shoulder it alone and its allies were willing to be protectorates. Both conditions are shifting. Japan is preparing to fight not because it wants to, but because it is no longer certain someone else will fight for it.